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LEGAL ISSUES IN MEDICINE
MEDICINE, DEATH, AND THE CRIMINAL 
LAW
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.
ERRORS in medicine are common and are at least
partly responsible for the deaths of 180,000 patients a
year.1,2 There is increasing concern about medical er-
rors and the steps that should be taken to prevent
them.1 Until recently, hospitals have addressed errors
after the fact, through mortality and morbidity confer-
ences, incident reports, and the like, rather than before
the fact, through attention to systems defects and pre-
vention. Likewise, medical-malpractice litigation can
be filed only after an injury has occurred. Malpractice
litigation is intended to create incentives to improve the
quality of medical care by making physicians and hos-
pitals accountable for their actions, but works by pro-
viding compensation for injury. A third mechanism,
sanction by state medical licensing boards, can have a
more direct effect, since action can be taken on the ba-
sis of a physician’s danger to patients — even if con-
sistently negligent acts have not resulted in injuries.
Nonetheless, licensing boards have not sought out mar-
ginally competent physicians and usually do not take
action until there has been grievous harm to a patient
or until a physician has been convicted of a crime.1
Criminal charges related to the practice of medicine
have primarily involved insurance fraud (including Medi-
care and Medicaid fraud), sexual abuse of patients, or
illegal use or prescription of controlled substances.
Criminal prosecution is generally thought to serve
three goals: deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation.
In medicine, rehabilitation is often considered the only
goal of sanctions by licensing boards. The ineffective-
ness of such sanctions and malpractice litigation in de-
terring error-prone behavior might make the criminal
law seem a necessary mechanism for prevention (deter-
rence), and the criminal law is, of course, the only le-
gitimate social mechanism we have for punishment
(retribution) in cases involving intentional or deliberate
disregard for patients’ safety.
Criminal prosecution of physicians for the deaths of
patients remains extraordinarily rare.3 Three recent
cases, however, provide an opportunity to examine the
use of the criminal law as a response to egregious med-
ical acts that result in death. The three cases, from
New York, Colorado, and Wisconsin, represent a range
of criminal prosecutions. As the Washington Post stated
in an editorial, “These three cases have particularly
shocking facts and terrible consequences for which civil
and professional penalties may not be enough.”4
THE NEW YORK CASE
Dr. Gerald Einaugler’s patient was a 78-year-old
woman with end-stage renal disease, diabetes, cardio-
vascular disease, and senility. She was transferred
from Brooklyn’s Interfaith Medical Center to a nurs-
ing home across the street in May 1990.5 At the nurs-
ing home, Dr. Einaugler mistook the patient’s peri-
toneal-dialysis catheter for a gastrostomy tube and
directed the staff to feed the patient through it. She re-
ceived several feedings through the dialysis catheter
before the mistake was discovered by a nurse. After he
had been notified of the mistake, Dr. Einaugler tele-
phoned the chief nephrologist at the medical center,
who advised him to “get the patient into the hospital.”6
After talking to the nephrologist, Dr. Einaugler went to
the nursing home to examine the patient but decided
to delay her transfer. A New York appeals court stated,
“Although the defendant knew that peritonitis could
be fatal if untreated, he did not direct the patient’s
transfer to the hospital for more than 10 hours after
his conversation with the nephrologist.”6 On admis-
sion, peritonitis was diagnosed, and the patient died
within days. Testimony by experts for both the prose-
cution and defense
established that proper medical care required treating the pa-
tient as soon as peritonitis was suspected, and following the
advice of the nephrologist. Thus the evidence established that
the defendant was aware of, and consciously disregarded, a
substantial risk of serious physical injury to the patient by de-
laying her transfer to the hospital, and that his conduct con-
stituted a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a rea-
sonable person would observe in the situation.6
Because of the delay, in July 1993 Dr. Einaugler was
convicted of reckless endangerment of his patient and
willful violation of New York’s health laws. In October
1994, the appeals court unanimously upheld the ver-
dict, ruling that the jury could have found the above ac-
count factual beyond a reasonable doubt.6 In addition
to supporting the conviction for reckless endangerment
in the second degree, the appeals court found that the
physician’s action violated New York’s public health
laws, which prohibit a physician from “willfully” com-
mitting “an act of neglect.”6 Willful neglect is defined
as “knowingly” failing to “provide timely, consistent,
safe, adequate, and appropriate services, treatment,
and/or care to a patient or resident of a residential
health care facility.”6
Medical organizations, including the American Med-
ical Association, have called the prosecution of Dr. Ein-
augler an inappropriate response to an error in medical
judgment. As one leading legal commentator noted,
“You know it’s an unusual case when the American
Medical Association’s defense of a physician is that
what he did was medical negligence.”7 In this case,
however, the physician was accused of a conscious (i.e.,
intentional) disregard for the patient’s safety in failing
to transfer her to a hospital for treatment, not an error
in medical judgment or a mistake in properly identify-
ing a feeding tube. As the appeals court said simply
and unanimously, this case “does not support the prop-
osition that medical professionals need fear the pros-
pect of unwarranted criminal prosecutions for honest
errors of medical judgment.”6 The prosecutor’s theory,
that Dr. Einaugler delayed his patient’s transfer in an
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attempt to cover up his original negligence, was consis-
tent with a conscious disregard for the patient’s safety,6
and the appeals court decided that the jury had ample
evidence to reach this verdict. Dr. Einaugler was sen-
tenced to spend 52 weekends in jail.5 The sentence was
later stayed, in March 1995, pending a further hearing
in U.S. District Court.
The law defines reckless endangerment as the con-
scious disregard of a known and substantial likelihood
of injury to the patient. If the patient dies as a result, a
charge of manslaughter is appropriate. Such a charge
was not made in this case, perhaps because the district
attorney did not believe he could prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that had the patient been transferred
sooner, she would have survived. An even more recent
case in New York provides an example of a case in
which a manslaughter charge seems appropriate. In
July and August 1995, Dr. David Benjamin was tried
for manslaughter on the basis of allegations that he
knowingly and intentionally performed a procedure (a
late abortion) that he did not have the skills to perform
and that his deliberate indifference to the health and
safety of his patient led directly to her death from ex-
cessive bleeding.8 The physician’s license to practice
medicine had already been revoked for “gross incom-
petence and negligence” in connection with five previ-
ous cases involving life-threatening uterine perfora-
tions. This death occurred during the three weeks he
was allowed to continue practicing medicine, before the
revocation became final.8
THE COLORADO CASE
On July 8, 1993, Dr. Joseph J. Verbrugge, Jr., an anes-
thesiologist, fell asleep during a mastoidectomy at St.
Joseph Hospital in Denver. The patient, eight-year-old
Richard Leonard, died. Judith F. Schulman, an admin-
istrative-law judge, conducted a hearing for the Colo-
rado Board of Medical Examiners. She found that
Dr. Verbrugge had been “grossly negligent” in perform-
ing a series of specific acts “covering virtually every
aspect” of the patient’s care.9 In her words, the “re-
spondent . . . failed to calibrate the anesthesia ma-
chine’s oxygen analyzer . . . failed to monitor properly
during surgery . . . failed to adequately respond to ev-
idence of a developing crisis during surgery . . . failed
to remain awake and otherwise alert and vigilant at cer-
tain times during the surgery. . . . Charting . . . in
certain cases was also falsified.”8,9
The boy’s temperature had risen to 107°F (41.6°C),
and his breathing tube was half blocked with mucus. It
is unclear exactly how long Dr. Verbrugge was asleep
or why the nurses did not wake him up. Contending
that the child died of malignant hyperthermia, Dr. Ver-
brugge argued that he should not be held responsible.
The judge, however, found that it was his lack of vigi-
lance that “in all likelihood directly resulted” in the pa-
tient’s death, that even if the child had had malignant
hyperthermia, he should have had a 90 percent chance
of survival, and that “if the main problem was an ob-
structed airway, early recognition would have resolved
the problem completely.”9 Dr. Verbrugge’s medical li-
cense, which had been summarily suspended in July
1993, was revoked on the basis of these findings. On
April 4, 1995, Dr. Verbrugge was charged with man-
slaughter in connection with the boy’s death.10 It was
also alleged that he had fallen asleep during at least six
other operations from September 1990 through March
1993, although no criminal charges were filed regard-
ing those allegations.10 The trial has not yet been held.
THE WISCONSIN CASE
The Wisconsin case involved two women, 29-year-
old Karin Smith, who died in 1995, and 39-year-old Do-
lores Geary, who died in 1993; both died of treatable
cervical cancer after the misreading of several Pap
smears. Smith had reported problems at 15 office visits
over a three-year period during which practitioners at
her health maintenance organization (HMO) had per-
formed three biopsies and obtained three Pap smears,
all but one of which (the last) were misread. Geary, a
member of the same HMO, also had two Pap smears
reported as normal before a 1991 hysterectomy, during
which advanced cervical cancer was discovered. The
HMO contracted with Chem-Bio Corporation to read
the smears in both cases. A six-member inquest jury
heard evidence that the laboratory’s director, a physi-
cian, paid a technician on a piecework basis to read
Pap smears. The technician had read 31,000 smears for
Chem-Bio and 16,000 for other laboratories in 1989, an
annual rate four times higher than that recommended
by the American Society of Cytology.11
On April 7, 1995, the inquest jury recommended that
criminal charges be brought against the director, the
technician, and the laboratory. The district attorney,
however, charged only the laboratory — with reckless
homicide. The trial date has been set for December 4.
Of course, if the corporation is found guilty, it cannot
be put in prison; the punishment will most likely be a
fine. The physician agreed that for the next six years,
he will not serve as a laboratory director, will not super-
vise any cytotechnologists, and will not do any work in
which he is responsible for quality control.12 The tech-
nician agreed not to read Pap smears on a piecework
basis, not to work more than 42 hours a week, and to
obey all regulations that govern the number of Pap
smears a technician can read in a day. Malpractice suits
against the laboratory director, the cytotechnologists,
and several other physicians were settled in the amounts
of $6.3 million for Mrs. Smith’s family and $3.5 million
for Mrs. Geary’s family.11
CRIMINAL STANDARDS IN MEDICINE
These three cases illustrate different applications of
the criminal law. In terms of the more traditional rem-
edies, only one has resulted in a decision by a licensing
board to limit a physician’s ability to practice medicine
(the Colorado case), and only one (the Wisconsin case)
has resulted in a completed malpractice action. In
fact, no civil suit was possible in the New York case,
because the deceased had no family and apparently
had no estate. Only one of these cases may have in-
volved financial motives to provide grossly substand-
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ard care (the Wisconsin case). Nonetheless, in all the
cases, criminal charges were brought in instances in
which patients died. 
Although criminal prosecutions of physicians are ex-
tremely rare, when they do occur, they almost always in-
volve charges of reckless or intentional gross deviation
from the accepted standard of care.3,13 This standard is
much higher than that used in medical-malpractice law-
suits, which, to be successful, require only proof of a
breach of duty resulting in harm to the patient. Breach
of duty is the failure to provide the level of care or treat-
ment that would have met the standard of care — that
is, the level that would have been considered acceptable
in the medical community. Deviation from the standard
of care, including a mistake of fact or judgment, is usu-
ally denoted simply as negligence or medical malprac-
tice. Unlike a criminal charge, which must be proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt, a charge of malpractice need
be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has put
physicians’ concern about criminal liability in proper
perspective: “Little need be said about criminal liabili-
ty: there is precious little precedent, and what there is
suggests that a doctor will be protected if he acts on a
good faith judgment that is not grievously unreasonable
by medical standards.”14 Thus, a physician will not be
held criminally liable for the death of a patient if that
death is the result of a good-faith error of judgment or
an inadvertent mistake.3,15 In the rare cases of criminal
prosecution, charges have usually been brought because
a pattern of deaths and reckless disregard for patients’
safety has emerged and, for some reason, the physi-
cian’s license has not been revoked.
In a recent California case, for example, a physician
was convicted of second-degree murder for intentional
conduct resulting in the deaths of nine patients over an
11-year period. The court found that the doctor was
“subjectively aware his methods of home and office
deliveries were life-endangering, but consciously and
deliberately disregarded these risks.”16 The court ex-
plained the difference between second-degree murder
and manslaughter as follows:
Second degree murder based on malice is committed when
the defendant does not intend to kill, but engages in conduct
which endangers the life of another, and acts deliberately with
conscious disregard for life. An essential distinction between
[second degree murder and] manslaughter based on criminal
negligence, is that in the former the defendant subjectively re-
alized the risk to human life created by his conduct, whereas
in the latter the defendant’s conduct objectively endangered
life, but he did not subjectively realize the risk.16
Even a large number of deaths will not be sufficient
for a criminal conviction unless the prosecution can
demonstrate the requisite intent or recklessness, which
will usually also involve identifying a specific standard
of care that the physician grossly violated and that
caused the deaths. For example, an appeals court in
New Jersey reversed the conviction of a physician on
the charge of involuntary manslaughter for the deaths
of 12 of his patients from hepatitis contracted through
intravenous injections.17 The primary reason for the re-
versal was that the state was unable to prove the pre-
cise manner in which hepatitis was transmitted to the
patients (the state suggested four possible theories of
causation, including the multiple use of saline bottles
and tubing). Thus, the state could not demonstrate that
the defendant had recklessly and grossly deviated from
the accepted standard in the care of his patients, be-
cause it could not show (beyond a reasonable doubt)
that all the ways in which the virus would have been
transmitted involved criminal negligence.17
A physician can be prosecuted for a single death that
was caused by intentional or reckless disregard of life,
but such prosecutions usually involve cases in which
there has been repeated and intentional disregard for a
patient’s welfare over a period of time. In a Pennsylva-
nia case, for example, a physician was found guilty of
involuntary manslaughter after issuing dozens of pre-
scriptions for controlled substances, including barbitu-
rates, which led to the death of his patient. The appeals
court found that the physician “consciously disregard-
ed a substantial and unjustified risk, which disregard
involved a gross deviation from the standard of con-
duct a reasonable person would have observed.”18 The
case of Dr. Verbrugge is typical of the few cases involv-
ing charges of involuntary manslaughter that have
been brought against physicians, in that it involved
a series of acts showing conscious disregard for a
patient’s safety. Prosecutors seem unwilling to bring
charges of criminal negligence on the basis of only one
act, probably because they think it will be difficult to
convince a jury that an isolated act demonstrates inten-
tional indifference to a patient’s welfare.
In this respect, the case of Dr. Einaugler is somewhat
unusual. He was charged not with the death of his pa-
tient but with the failure to transfer her to the hospital
for proper treatment in a timely manner. His misiden-
tification of the dialysis tube was thus viewed as an in-
advertent error, whereas his failure to act to protect the
patient after he discovered the error was considered
a conscious decision to risk her life for no medical rea-
son. It is disturbing that the New York licensing board
found that Dr. Einaugler’s care of this patient was not
substandard and that there was no need to discourage
such treatment. Prosecutors may feel an additional ob-
ligation to the public to take action when professional
self-regulation does not function to protect the public.
Of the three cases, the Wisconsin case is the most
unusual, yet also the one that may exemplify the types
of criminal cases that will become more frequent in our
current system of market-driven medical care. The
prosecutor did not bring criminal charges against the
laboratory director, apparently because he believed that
the public could be adequately protected by the direc-
tor’s agreement not to run a laboratory for six years
and because at least some punishment had been meted
out through malpractice litigation. The prosecutor did
bring criminal charges against the laboratory.
We will continue to see criminal cases, and they are
likely to differ from the current cases involving fraud,
sexual abuse, and illegal drug prescription in frequency
rather than in kind.19 Some new cases, however, may in-
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volve patients’ deaths from acts or omissions motivated
by the desire to cut costs. Making more money is not a
matter of medical judgment. If a healthy bottom line
becomes more important than the health of the pa-
tient, it will seem perfectly reasonable for prosecutors
to use the criminal law to protect patients and punish
offenders. Prosecutors must, however, demonstrate that
the physicians involved knew their cost-cutting meas-
ures would put patients’ lives at risk and consciously or
recklessly disregarded that risk. It may not be possible
to provide such proof in most cases. However, individ-
ual officers or directors of medical organizations could
be charged with manslaughter if they pursued policies
they knew would result in death or if they were aware
of the substantial risk of death and consciously dis-
regarded it in setting organizational rules. Obviously,
corporations and managers who are not physicians
cannot use the defense of good-faith medical judgment,
since nonphysicians cannot make medical judgments.
CONCLUSIONS
When a physician’s egregious medical acts result in
the death of a patient, the public expects that some ac-
tion will be taken against the physician. Therefore,
prosecutors may be more likely to turn to criminal
prosecutions if proposals are enacted to limit civil lia-
bility by making it much harder for injured patients to
sue negligent physicians. Also, if medical licensing
boards continue to be ineffective in imposing sanctions
against grossly negligent and incompetent behavior
by physicians, prosecutors may conclude that criminal
charges are the only way to protect the public.
The medical profession’s reputation for acting in the
best interests of patients is undermined not only by the
publicity that criminal prosecutions generate but also
by cost cutting in a competitive medical market. Physi-
cians can respond positively by strengthening licensing
boards, articulating and following reasonable stand-
ards of care, and developing more effective injury-pre-
vention programs. Responsible physicians have noth-
ing to fear from the criminal law. When physicians
intentionally or recklessly disregard their patients’ safe-
ty, however, they properly face criminal prosecution.
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COMMUNITY CHILD HEALTH: AN ACTION PLAN FOR 
TODAY
By Judith S. Palfrey. 302 pp. Westport, Conn., Praeger, 1994.
$55. ISBN 0-275-94696-7.
Judith Palfrey has written a well-organized, readable book
about children’s health as it is affected by forces in the com-
munity. Physicians, social workers, and community health
workers, as well as politicians and others who shape public
policy, would benefit from reading it.
Palfrey leads the reader to conclude that we have entered
a new era in child health. She divides the 20th century into
the initial classic period, when physiologic investigation and
technological innovation led to remarkable improvements in
nutrition, the treatment of infectious diseases, and approach-
es to prematurity, and the second period, characterized by the
“new morbidity,” with attention to psychosocial and educa-
tional concepts. Palfrey introduces us to a third period, in
which children suffer from epidemics of violence, acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome, homelessness, and social disor-
der. She also includes the increasing numbers of survivors of
chronic disease, children who initially benefited from high-
technology care but who are now left with the chronic after-
math. She portrays the present status of childhood health
with brief, practical clinical vignettes and suggests how child
health workers could involve the community in attacking
these problems. She advocates an inclusive approach that
would extend far beyond individual practitioners and even be-
yond the established teams of hospital-based physicians, nurs-
es, social workers, and dietitians in large cities. She invites
teachers, community members, and others to help solve the
problems children face in their homes, neighborhoods, and
schools.
Drawing on 20 years of experience in the community-
health arena in Boston, Palfrey gives detailed plans of action.
Concrete examples include averting teenage pregnancy, con-
trolling infection in a group home, and caring for preschool-
ers with chronic illness. The last chapters encourage commu-
nity political action to improve the lot of children. They
explore the political realities that hamper even well-meaning
attempts to assist children living in poverty or in disrupted
families, children in violent environments and foster and
group care, and children with chronic diseases. The author’s
message is one of optimism, in spite of widespread problems
facing such children. Her prescription is for a focused ap-
proach, often starting with small, achievable goals and estab-
lished granting agencies. A team may then build on their suc-
cesses and pursue more ambitious needs. The book clearly
identifies many resources, each chapter has a large supply of
endnotes, and a 29-page bibliography ensures that this is a
practical tool.
Palfrey is a leader in applying the resources of Children’s
Hospital of Boston, well known for highly technical tertiary
care activities, to the preventive and continuing-care issues of
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